THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON RETIREMENT IN THE EARLY 1970s"
We analyze detailed longitudinal data on a cohort of males aged 58-67 in 1969-1973 , a period of substantial increases in real Social Security benefits. We find the following: (1)the accelerating decline in labor force participation of elderly men in [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] can be explained by the large increase in real Social Security benefits; (2) there is evidence of a liquidity constraint effect for an important subgroup of the elderly; (3) the magnitude of this induced retirement effect is large enough that ignoring it can lead to serious underestimation of the fiscal implications of changes in benefit provisions. Our results are interpreted in the historical context of a particular cohort undergoing major, unanticipated transfers of wealth; the steady-state effects of Social Security on retirement may not be the same.
The labor force participation rates of the elderly have been in decline for decades; but in about 1970 the rate of decline seemed to accelerate. For example, between 1962 and 1969 the participation rates of males age 60-64 and 65 and over fell by 5.0 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. From 1969 to 1973 they fell by 6.2 percent and 4.2 percent. What were the causes of these declines, and can we expect them to continue? In this paper we give a partial answer to the first question by linking it with another important fact: beginning in about 1969 the level of real Social Security benefits was raised by Congressional action. These increases were by no means trivial: the average benefit of a beneficiary husband and wife increased by 28 percent in real terms from 1970 to 1972 between February 1968 and January 1976 the maximum benefit possible increased by about 133 percent, while the Consumer Price Index increased by about 54 percent. A consequence of the large increases in benefits and the decline in labor force participation of people age 62 and over has been the increasing fraction of personal income derived from Social Security benefit payments: in 1970,3 percent; in 1976,3.5 percent. Another consequence was that the amount of employee and employer contributions to the Social Security trust funds proved to be inade-quate at the levels called for by the laws of the early 1970s. For example, the 1969 law envisioned a contribution rate of 5.7 percent by both employees and employers in 1976; the 1971 law changed the rate to 5.85 percent, which was the actual rate in 1976. More important was the increase in the tax base: the base increased from $7,800 in 1968 to $29,700 in 1981, with a rate of 6.65 percent. Thus, the maximum contribution by each employee and employer rose from $374 in 1970 to $1,975 in 1981.
We investigate the relationship between retirement and Social Security with data from the Retirement History Survey (RHS). This survey of about 11,000 heads of households who were between the ages of 58 and 63 inclusive in 1969 is ideal for the period of study because the heads reached the most likely retirement ages just at the time of the increases in Social Security benefits. They thus constitute an experimental population who were subjected to substantial increases in assets, which, it is reasonable to suppose, were not anticipated.
From the RHS we have selected a subsample of white working husbands, and from the subsample we give a wide range of evidence that there was a relationship between Social Security benefits and retirement probabilities.
The evidence ranges from the calculation of simple retirement probabilities by age to the specification and estimation of logistic probability equations. The data strongly support the view that there was a positive relationship between Social Security benefits and retirement probabilities: this relationship comes out almost independently of the way in which the data are studied. In the latter part of the work when we attach magnitudes to the effect of Social Security benefits, we find that the changes in benefits in the early 1970s offer a good explanation of the decline in labor force participation over that period. We conclude it is reasonable to hold that a substantial part of the decline in participation and subsequent increase in costs of the Social Security system were caused by retirement induced by increases in Social Security benefits.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
It may seem obvious that the Social Security system can have an effect on retirements; but this view is certainly not universally accepted in the theoretical literature, and it is not always supported in the empirical literature. Part of the disagreement comes because people do not distinguish carefully between the short run and the long run. This is especially true in the empirical literature. Gordon and Blinder [19801, for example, take as a working hypothesis that the Social Security system has no effect on retirement. They do not, however, consider that changes in the Social Security law which result in unexpected asset transfers could affect retirement, even though the system might have no effect on retirements in long-run steady state. Alternatively, we [Boskin and Hurd, 19781 considered the long-run effects when workers have high rates of time discount; in that situation there are very high tax rates on working past age 62.
A second source of disagreement is that some researchers have not carefully researched the complex Social Security law. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise [I9801 especially have made a valuable contribution by pointing out important features of the law ignored by previous researchers. Here we summarize the law.
Eligible workers may retire a t age 62, but their benefits are permanently reduced from what they would receive a t age 65. For reasonable rates of discount the reduction is actuarially fair, so the reduction is not a tax; rather it is saving. If the worker has enough private assets, he can substitute them in consumption for Social Security benefits before the age of 65, and therefore, the retirement date can be chosen independently of the desired consumption stream. Under these circumstances the Social Security system in the steady state would have no influence on retirement before 65. At 65 the reduction is not actuarially fair, so the system will encourage retirement a t 65. There is one circumstance in which the Social Security system will induce retirement before 65: someone who has few private assets cannot choose his time of retirement independently of consumption, since one cannot borrow against future Social Security payments. A prediction is that in the steady state some individuals may be induced to retire early in order to increase current income and consumption. We call this the liquidity constraint hypothesis; it has been analyzed by Crawford and Lilien [1981] . They show that a liquidity constraint is likely to cause higher retirement a t 62 than otherwise. People with higher ratios of Social Security wealth to private wealth will retire less frequently before 62 and more frequently at 62 than people with lower ratios but with the same total wealth.
A feature of the Social Security law that has not been mentioned or exploited in the empirical literature is the large increase in real Social Security wealth during the early 1970s. It does not seem reasonable or appropriate to analyze retirement data from that period under steady-state assumptions. In particular, we believe a useful hypothesis to maintain is that a substantial fraction of real Social Security benefits were unexpected increases in restof-lifetime wealth, which will induce retirements at any age under usual theory. Because people with large levels of Social Security wealth had larger increases in real benefits, we should find that high Social Security wealth is associated with high probabilities of retirement. However, the liquidity constraint should be less important than in the steady state because people who find themselves with unexpectedly high levels of Social Security wealth will not have had the time to dissave, as they would in the steady state.
In what follows, we do not attempt to develop a theory or empirical estimate of expected future benefit increases. The two most obvious candidates, extrapolation of recent benefit increases or increases to keep pace with inflation, would yield expected increases in the period 1969-1972 of 17 percent and 18 percent, respectively. The actual increase was three times this large. Thus, the overwhelming bulk of the increase would be wanticipated, and the increases were roughly proportional to benefits. Further, the actual or (as just estimated) "unanticipated increases even over so short a period were a large fraction of the cross-section variation in benefits. Our main goal is to present evidence of the existence of real Social Security wealth and liquidity constraint effects, not to pin down precise magnitudes.
The retirement probabilities observed in the data from the early 1970s will be useful for analyzing changes in retirement when there are changes in Social Security wealth, but we would not want to claim that they reveal the effect of the system in the long run. A complete study would carefully distinguish the steady state from the transitory. With the available data this is not a t all easy to do, and we do not attempt that here. Our goal here is to show that the changes in the law in the early 1970s seem to have had an effect on retirement of a substantial magnitude, and to show that the data are roughly in consonance with the theoretical expectations.
We do not believe that the state of research on the effect of social security on retirement is advanced enough that we should
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771 be dogmatic about the specification of estimating equations. Rather our aim will be to present a wide range of evidence from simple conditional probabilities to logistic probability functions. We believe that a t a minimum the data show convincingly that there was some effect of Social Security on retirement; a t a maximum if one has confidence in the magnitudes of our estimates, they provide a good explanation of the decline in labor force participation of the elderly.
Our data come from the 1969, 1971, and 1973 waves of the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (RHS) and from Social Security earnings history data that were merged with the RHS data. We have substantially complete information on asset holdings, wage rates, work patterns, family structure, and other usual economic and demographic variables over these years. Most importantly, from Social Security earnings records we can calculate the retirement benefits that a worker would receive if he were to retire.
Our basic working data set consists of all white married men who were working a t the beginning of our sample period as salaried employees in the private sector, whose wives were not in the labor force in this peri0d.l
Before we turn to the data on retirement, we present some evidence that the liquidity constraint hypothesis may have support in the data. As outlined in the Appendix, we calculated net assets, housing wealth, and Social Security wealth, which is the present value of expected Social Security benefits if the worker were to retire. Of 61-year-old workers, 22 percent had total assets, including housing but excluding Social Security wealth, of less than $12,000 in 1969 dollars. If housing wealth (because it may not be very liquid) is excluded, 22 percent had less than $3,000. About 9 percent had essentially no nonhousing assets, yet 31 percent of this group had more than $20,000 in Social Security wealth. These examples, taken from more extensive tables we report elsewhere, suggest that there are many people near the end of their work lives who have accumulated almost no private wealth. Whether this is in response to the "savings" required by the Social Security system or the result of negative ex post rates of return on investments cannot be determined in the data; but it is still true that increases in Social Security wealth could not induce retirement before age 62 in this group. We conclude that the distribution of assets certainly increases the plausibility of the liquidity constraint hypothesis.
To study retirement, the data were divided into six subsets. Each subset is used to estimate the probability that a person retires at a particular age given that he has not previously retired. Thus, for example, the age 62 data set consists of all workers who reach their sixty-second birthday without having retired. All the estimates presented in this paper are conditional probabilities of retiring.
We define retirement simply to occur when someone leaves the labor force and does not reenter by the end of our sample p e r i~d .We found very little evidence of unretirement, even though in some cases we have a period of observation of more than five years in which to observe r e e n t r~.~ This is, of course, not absolutely certain: it is possible that some workers leave the labor force and reenter after a long period out of the labor force. There are, however, a number of theoretical and empirical reasons for believing this does not happen often: the Social Security system itself makes this kind of behavior unattractive; job skills are bound to deteriorate, and reentry wages suffer. On the empirical side in addition to our calculations on labor force reentry, are data reported by Hall [I9801 on job tenure. These data which come from special labor force reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that very few workers above the age of 60 hold new jobs. Since the fraction that drops out of the labor force for more than a year and then reenters to hold a job would be very much smaller than this fraction, the number of unretirements must be very small indeed. Finally, Gordon and Blinder [I9801 report that there is a substantial decline in the wage rate asso-2. Other definitions in this data set are possible: for example, people who left the labor force were asked if they were retired. We chose the behavioral definition because of considerable ambiguity in many of the answers to that question.
3. In addition, we were conservative in guarding against end effects. For example, the last vintage that was used in calculating the retirement probabilities at 62 was vintage 5, which is comprised of workers aged 59 on January 1,1969. All of this vintage was 63 on January 1, 1973, and since the survey was in the Spring of 1973, we can be sure that anyone who enters the calculations of the age 62 retirement probability was observed during his entire sixty-second year. Anyone who was classified as retired would have had, on average, about a year of no job holding or job search activity. Of course, anyone who left the labor force a t age 62, and reentered before the survey in the Spring of 1973, would not have been counted as retired; but in our data there are very few such cases. It is possible that this upper truncation could account for part of the apparently rising retirement probabilities; but if the evidence from the vintages that are oberved for long periods provides a reliable indication of the effect, it is small.
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Conditional Probability of Retirement by Age ciated with job changes at the ages we study. This would induce workers either to remain at their job or to retire. They conclude that the typical worker will work full time until he nears retirement and then withdraw completely from the labor force.
In Figure I we present the simple conditional retirement probabilities a t each age. They are calculated by dividing the number of workers who retire a t a certain age by the number who reach that age without previously retiring. The striking feature of the graph is that the conditional retirement probabilities increase smoothly from age 59 through age 66 except for sharp jumps a t age 62 and 65. At age 65 there are a number of reasons why there should be a high frequency of retirement: some workers face mandatory retirement; workers may become eligible for private pensions; and the actuarial reduction is certainly not fair. At age 62 there are no institutional reasons of any serious empirical magnitude except for Social Security to explain why the retirement rate is about 50 percent higher than what would be expected by a straight line interpolation between ages 61 and 63. These data do not tell us of course which features of Social Security cause the extra retirements, but we believe they give strong support to the view that there is some effect.
In Table I Prohab~llt~es, and standard errors number of ohservat~ons, a t least part of 1969 retired with a probability of 0.05 a t age 62 whereas workers of vintage 5, who would have been 62 for part of 1972 retired a t age 62 with probability 0.19. These are very large changes in retirement probabilities over just a few years, and the detail from this table shows that the decline in labor force participation of 60-64 year olds reported in the introduction is due to changes in retirement probabilities a t all ages. What could have caused the large changes? At this point the answer is purely speculative; but the large changes in real Social Security benefits were concentrated in the years spanned by this table. Roughly speaking, from the bottom entry in a column to the top entry spans the calendar years of 1969 to 1972, precisely the years when real Social Security benefits rose most rapidly.
Our next step was to ask whether the workers with high potential levels of Social Security benefits were those who tended to retire most frequently. To answer this question and to make the comparison with other assets, we constructed each worker's 1969 Social Security wealth, the present value of the Social Security both the worker and his family would receive if the worker were to retire in 1969. We assumed he would live to his life expectancy and his widow to hers. We discounted a t 6 percent4 A cross tabulation of retirement by five categories of Social Security wealth, six categories of private assets in 1969, and seven vintages were made. The assets are net assets including housing wealth but excluding Social Security wealth. Details are given in the Appendix. From the cross tabulations, all cases in which there were a t least ten observations on two levels of Social Security wealth holding constant the other variables are reported in Table  11 . By comparing adjacent rows, one can see the difference in retirement frequencies as the value of Social Security wealth changes holding constant asset category and vintage. For example, the conditional probability of retirement of workers at age 62 was 0.09 for workers of vintage 5, assets of $10-25,000 and Social Security wealth of $15-20,000; the conditional probability of retirement of workers of the same vintage and asset category but with Social Security wealth of $20-25,000 was 0.29. The results in this table are rather remarkable because high Social Security wealth is almost always associated with high retirement 4. Since the discount factor is just multiplicative to Social Security benefits, a different discount factor would change the magnitude but not the sign of the effects. The change in magnitude from changing the discount factor is easlly calculable. probabilities (except a t age 61 when assets are low, and in several cases a t age 64 when there are very few observations and the standard errors are high). The discussion of the Social Security law indicated why a t ages before 62 increases in Social Security benefits would not cause a change in retirement probabilities among workers with low other assets. If we exclude the three comparisons at age 61 in the first asset category on the grounds that these workers had low private assets (the median asset holding among all workers a t that age was about $33,0001, we can make twenty-one comparisons. Of these, seventeen have higher retirement probabilities associated with increased Social Security wealth. Of the four with the reverse sign, two (those a t age 64) have very large standard errors (entry a t vintage 2, Social Se-curity wealth of $20-25,000 has a standard error of about 0.12, for example).
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Because the cross tabulation is by wealth and Social Security wealth in 1969 and by vintage, the row comparisons are crosssection comparisons. Roughly they indicate differences in retirement probabilities when people are classified according to initial wealth, and they are observed through time. But since our comparison is over people who have not retired, and the changes in the law were changes raising benefits of everyone to preserve rankings in the distribution of benefits a row comparison is probably a good comparison over ranking of benefits in the year of retirement. Some comparison of the trend in probabilities can be seen by comparing probabilities across vintage, holding Social Security wealth constant. For example, at retirement age 62 and assets of $10-25,000 the probabilities in the $20-25,000 Social Security wealth category increased from 0.0 to 0.29 as vintage increased from 2 to 5. Because vintage 2 reached age 62 in 1968 and vintage 5 reached age 62 in 1971, the latter vintages actually had considerable higher Social Security wealth than indicated in the table due to the increases in benefits from changes in the law.
It is difficult to find any systematic relationship between asset levels in 1969 and subsequent retirement besides the relationship implied by the liquidity constraint hypothesis. Simple theory would suggest ceteris paribus a positive relationship: if assets are exogenous, they will be used a t least partly to purchase leisure; if assets are endogenous, people who plan early retirement will accumulate at high levels to finance the retirement. Of course, in these tables everything else is not held constant: in particular, there is no control for the wage rate, which is correlated with assets.
More extensive cross tabulations are not practical, so we estimated conditional logistic probability of retirement equations for each of the ages 59 through 65 inclusive. To account for the increase in eventual benefits that comes from further work, we consider the present value of the Automatic Benefit Recalculation (ABR) to be a wage subsidy. Thus, the wage variable takes into account the work incentive effects of the ABR. The asset variable is a ca~egorical variable that indicates in which quartile of the asset distribution the observation lies. Social Security wealth is defined as above. Health status takes the value 1 if the person's health was judged by him to be worse than average in 1969, and zero otherwise. Because everyone in the sample was a t work when the question was asked, the response is free from the obvious kind of ex post bias. The complete results are in Table V , Appendix. In Table I11 we give the change in retirement probabilities associated with a $10,000 change in Social Security wealth, where the wage interaction is evaluated a t the median of the wage in each group. The point estimate of the change in probability is used; that is, if then In the estimate, P was taken to be the observed frequency. The results of Table I11 are remarkably consistent with the cross tabulations: when assets are low before the age of 62, Social Security wealth does not have a positive association with retirement probabilities; of the other twenty entries all but three are positive. If these results are interpreted as giving changes in retirement probabilities from an unexpected change in Social Security wealth, they are in very close agreement with the two main predictions made in Section 11: that Social Security wealth would have a positive effect on retirement; that people younger than 62 with low assets would be little affected by changes in Social Security The wealth categories are the quartiles a t each age. The changes Include the wage interact~on evaluated at the medlans. They are calculated on the linear approximation as p ( l -p ) -(logit coefficient), where p is the observed probability. The entry at wealth = 2 and age = 64 gives an estimated probability of -0.091 when the linear approximation is used The number in parentheses gives the change when the Iogt function is used. The second number is used in calculating the average. wealth. One result that was not predicted by the theory, but which comes out quite strongly is that until the age of 65 workers with low private assets are not strongly affected by changes in Social Security wealth. For example, the average change in probability before the age of 65 over the two lower wealth groups was 0.049.
Before we discuss how the other variables influence retirement, we report on several tests of the null hypothesis that social security does not influence retirement. Our tests are not the customary t-tests for reasons related to the functional form of the probability equations. We have little information on the appropriate form, but we do want it to be rather general. The liquidity constraint hypothesis, for example, indicates that Social Security wealth will influence retirement according to the level of private wealth, and the form of the dependence will vary with retirement age. We were, therefore, led to estimate separate equations at each age with many interactions. This brought the total number of coefficients to 123. Of course, the more general the functional form, the fewer number of individual coefficients will be significant. Furthermore, interactions make it more difficult to test for an overall systematic effect: the t-statistic on a particular coefficient tests whether the interaction is significant, not whether Social Security itself has a significant effect. Nevertheless, if Social Security does have an important effect on retirement, there will be a consistent pattern of positive responses even when many interactions are allowed. The sign test, therefore, is the basis for the first of our two tests. In the cross tabulations reported in Table  11 , there are thirty-three possible comparisons of retirement probabilities as social security wealth varies. The liquidity constraint hypothesis suggests that the three entries a t age 61 with low assets be eliminated. After eliminating nine other entries due to missing data and one because of no change, twenty entries remain. Of these, sixteen are positive. We ask: if the true effect of Social Security wealth is zero, what is the probability that sixteen or more of these comparisons will be positive?
Similarly, in Table 111 , there are twenty-four estimates of the effects of Social Security on retirement. Eliminating the four entries at ages 60 and 61 in the two low wealth categories leaves twenty, of which seventeen are positive. What is the probability that seventeen or more will be positive if Social Security has no influence on retirement? Finally, we estimated a much more restrictive model, but which describes quite well the overall effects of Social Security on retirement. These results are given in Table   QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS   TABLE IV   Sign test Sign test from from cross tabulation probability equation
One-sided 2 test VI (see the Appendix). We tested the null hypothesis of no effect against the alternative of a positive effect. Our test statistic is the one-sided 2 statistic. More details on that test are given in the Appendix. The results of these tests are given in Table IV . They show that at very high significance levels, Social Security did have a n effect on retirement.
IV. FURTHER RESULTS
Our results present estimates of the effects of other variables on the age-specific conditional retirement probabilities. Among the more interesting findings are the substantial effects of health status and of mandatory retirement provisions. While the effects of health are a source of some controversy (see Campbell and Campbell [19761) , we avoid the worst potential biases by examining the effect of health status, defined as of 1969 on subsequent retirement behavior. The effects of bad health are strong at all ages; the cumulative effect on labor force participation results in a difference in the labor force participation rate at age 65 (for those in the labor force a t age 59) of over thirty percentage points (0.298 versus 0.601) for those in poor health relative to those not in poor health as of 1969.
Mandatory retirement from the current job a t age 65 strongly increases the probability of complete retirement a t age 65 (from 0.445 to 0.889). The vintage variables, normalized on the youngest vintage for which there are observations, reveal (except a t age 60) a trend toward higher probabilities of retirement. This finding takes into account, within the functional form, the growing size of Social Security wealth. It is, of course, possible that we have underestimated the size of the effect of Social Security wealth on retirement by attributing part of the effect of the growing Social Security wealth to vintage. If the vintage coefficients are translated into probabilities, they show less variation than the vintage effects that can be deduced from the probabilities of Table I . Thus, some of the trend in probabilities that appeared in Table I by scanning up the columns has been accounted for by the variables that appear in the logistic function. Surely the most important of these variables is Social Security wealth. Thus, the substantial collinearity between Social Security wealth and vintage requires that vintage be taken into account when estimating the effects of Social Security on retirement; further, while increasing Social Security benefits are partly responsible for the trend toward early retirement, there is a residual trend that should be the subject of further investigation.
Evidence of the effect of the remaining variables--other assets, wage interactions, and wife's age-is mixed. The variation in retirement probabilities with assets is small; the most consistent finding-and even here, there are exceptions-is that workers in the highest asset quartile retire more frequently than other workers. Evaluating the wage interactions a t the medians reveals very little systematic variation of the wage with probabilities and no pattern in them with respect to wealth. The variable indicating wife's age does not show any systematic effect on retirement pr~babilities.~ To check the robustness of the functional form specification, we estimated the logistic probability of retirement equations with several other specifications. Social Security wealth and the wage rate were entered linearly, interacted with wealth, and interacted with wealth and with each other. In all specifications the basic pattern of the effects of Social Security on retirement was the same as the results of Table VI. The overall levels of the effects were somewhat smaller, indicating the importance of allowing the general specification of Table I . We conclude that our main results in a qualitative sense are not very sensitive to the specification, but that an overly restrictive specification will mask the absolute magnitude of the effects.
V. INDUCED RETIREMENT FORCE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR
If we continue to interpret the results of Table I11 as changes in retirement probabilities caused by a change in Social Security wealth, we can ask how would labor force participation of the elderly change when Social Security benefits change as they did during the early 1970s. Under the assumption that no one reenters the labor force once he has retired, the conditional probabilities of retirement can be used to calculate the labor force participation rates by age of people who were working a t age 59. The participation rates at age j are (1 -pJ(1 -p,) . . . (1 -pj) , where the pi are the observed frequencies of retirement conditional on working until the ith age. The changes in conditional probabilities for a change in Social Security wealth are taken from Table 111 , and added to the observed frequencies. These new conditional probabilities produce the predicted changes in labor force participation rates. The declines attributed to a change of $10,000 in social security wealth are shown in Figure II .6 The average decline can be compared to the actual declines in participation that occur during the early 1970s as follows: from the base date of February 1968, the law was changed several times to increase benefits, given work history. By September 1972, the increases totaled 52 percent. Someone contemplating retirement in 1973 would, therefore, have benefits about 52 percent higher than a comparable person in 1968.7 The median Social Security wealth in our sample in 1969 was about $25,000 (real 1969) , and a 52 percent change would be $13,000, a nominal change of $10,727 in 1969 dollars. According to our probability of retirement equations, a $10,000 real change produces a 0.078 decline in participation, so a $10,726 change would produce a 0.084 decline (ignoring second-order effects). The actual participation rates were 77.3 percent in 1968 and 69.1 percent in 1973-a decline of 8.2 percent.' We see, therefore,'that the estimated effects of Social 6. The results in Table I11 give the probability changes when the slope of the logistic function is evaluated a t the observed frequency, and the slope a t that point is used to estimate the probability change. An alternative method when the change in the right-hand variable is large is to estimate the probability for new value from the logistic function, and subtract from that the initial frequency. Because the starting frequencies are small except for 65-year olds, this method will increase the estimated probability changes associated with a change in Social Security wealth of $10,000. In fact, the average change in conditional probability is estimated to be 0.070 by this method. This compares with an average taken from Security on retirement probabilities are very close to the actual declines in participation during the period of study. Because the comparison on changes in labor force participation is made with independent data, we feel it lends support to the interpretation that a substantial part of the variation in Social Security wealth is the result of unexpected changes caused by legislation, and that therefore, the interpretation of the changes in conditional probabilities as partial regression effects is reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that in any way the data were analyzed we found a positive association between retirement probabilities and Social Security wealth. When probability equations were specified to allow numerical magnitudes to be estimated for this association, the sizes of the effects were found to be reasonable in the sense that the observed changes in labor force participation taken from an independent data source were consistent with the observed changes in Social Security benefits and the estimated effects of changes in Social Security benefits.
Although we believe our results show convincingly that there was an effect on retirement from the large changes in benefits in the early 1970s, we readily acknowledge that much needs to be done to understand the complete effects of a Social Security system. In particular, we have not distinguished in this work between transitory effects caused by changes in the system and longrun effects that would remain if the system were to remain unchanged for a long period. We did not attempt to estimate separately the effects for several reasons. First, our data were not well suited for this because all of the observations were subject to the large changes in benefits. As the later years of the RHS are made available for analysis, it may become possible to do this because
in later years the changes in benefit levels were made to depend on the CPI rather than on Congressional action. Even so, within a life-cycle context, the transition from the shocks of the early 1970s to the steady state may take more years than the RHS will cover. The second major reason our results cannot distinguish between the long run and the short run is that we have not -constructed a complete life-cycle model of asset accumulation and labor supply. In particular, we have not taken into account that, at least in the steady state, assets, Social Security wealth, and the wage may be econometrically endogenous, which will produce formidable statistical difficulties. We believe that by taking advantage of what was essentially an experiment on the retirementage population these difficulties are lessened. At a minimum we would claim that changes in benefits have some effect on retirement.
An implication to be drawn from these results is that if the law on benefit calculation is changed, the costs of the law change will not be simply the direct costs of the change in benefits over the retired population. Rather, there will be induced retirement in addition, and that will have to be taken into account to forecast accurately the effects of a law change.
The basic working sample consisted of white, married males. They must have satisfied the following criteria: private wage worker in 1969 or at last job if not employed; a calculable wage rate in 1968 or 1969; a nonworking wife; not a welfare recipient in 1969; a wage rate between $1 and $35; net wealth between -$5,000 and $1,000,000; survived until the 1973 survey. The main variables were constructed as follows:
Net Wealth. Data were reported on every important category of assets and liabilities. For example, we have the individual's estimate of his house value, his stock value, savings accounts, bonds, and so forth. There are corresponding entries on the liability side. Pensions were reported to be a monthly payment that we converted to a wealth stock by discounting at 6 percent expected payments until death.
Social Security (SS) Wealth. Under the Social Security law, benefits are usually calculated from earnings since 1950; however, in some circumstances earnings before 1950 may be used. The wife's benefit is 50 percent of the husband's PIA but in some circumstances her benefit on her own contribution would be greater than her wife's benefit. The law allows the maximum always to be taken.
The present value of SS, which we call SS wealth, is the present value of the future benefit payments to the husband and wife (and later to the widow if she outlives the husband) discounted at 6 percent. Each is assumed to live to his life expectancy. The benefits are calculated according to the law in effect at the time of the calculation. The value of SS wealth varies as a worker ages for several reasons: his earnings change; the law may change; his life expectancy changes; the wife's life expectancy changes. We therefore, calculate the SS wealth each year from 1969 through 1973, and the value that enters the probability of retirement at a given age will be the value faced at that age.
The Wage Rate. The two main problems in calculating the wage rate are that there is no standard time interval over which earnings are reported, and that earnings increase the value of Social Security wealth through the recalculation of AME and PIA. The first problem was not empirically important, but it did cause us to drop some observations from the sample when we were unable to calculate an hourly wage. The second problem was handled by converting the increase in Social Security wealth into a wage subsidy. This was done by calculating what Social Security wealth would be if the person were to work another year. The difference between that value and the actual value of Social Security wealth was converted into a wage subsidy by assuming he works during the coming year the number of hours he worked the past year.
The one-sided ,$ test is the multivariate version of the onesided t-test. It Is appropriate when the alternative hypothesis has at least one positive coefficient. This differs from the usual case where the alternative hypothesis' coefficient is not zero, but the sign is not specified. We feel the one-sided alternative is appropriate because most people would agree that the effect of Social Security wealth on retirement is not negative. The test is a special case of a test described in KudB [19631, which is a Kuhn-Tucker test.
The test statistic is formed by summing the squares of the positive t-statistics. Its distribution under the null hypothesis is a weighted sum of ,$ random variables. In our general model the test statistic is almost impossible to calculate, so we estimated a simpler version with no interactions. This simpler model describes the overall effect of Social Security on retirement well, although of course it does not have the detail of the general model. The tstatistics on the Social Security wealth variable by age are (60) 1.66; (61) 0.79; (62) 1.53; (63) 1.53; (64) -0.90; (65) 1.11; the sum of squares of the positive values is 9.29. Under the null hypothesis (all coefficients are zero), the probability that the sum would exceed 9.29 is given by 6 c I That probability is 0.036. Thus, a 5 percent critical point would be less than 9.29, and we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. 
